Phone UI and touch precision overhaul, proxy fixes, Orbital Uplink, four new maps
Phone panels (reviewed + QA'd, matrix of 22 layouts with real taps/bounding boxes): - selected-tower action bar over the board (Upgrade/Sell/Target/close), info panel updated in place so taps are never lost, scrollable palette for 7+ towers, overlays with pinned footers (Help "Got it", Play solo, Join always visible), tappable room chip to invite, reduced-motion/contrast/forced-colors fixes, paused state, partner cursor labels, bigger level pips and owner flags - touch input rewritten around "pointerdown commits nothing": pinch never builds, 10px tap slop, palm-proof pinch, long-press pings with any tool armed, nudge arrows for precise placement, hotkey repeat guard, proportional wheel zoom - new e2e: select/sell, info-panel stability, UI states, touch precision; camera unit tests Proxy/server (reproduced against real nginx 1.26 with NPM v2.16 config): - Origin check works when the proxy drops a non-default port, TRUSTED_PROXIES for proxies on global IPv6/CGNAT addresses, service worker no longer serves nginx's 502 page, DEPLOY.md corrected (NPM default read timeout is 90 s, Advanced-tab limits, path-prefix, cookie size, per-IP cap behaviour) Content: - Orbital Uplink: 4-level endgame tower (450 + 500/800/1200 credits): piercing armour-ignoring beam, blast and lingering slow, ground+air, range 11-14; glyph, beam effect, sound, help text, unit tests - Maps: The Canyon, Archipelago, Fortress, Pinwheel (7 maps total) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tb8pW2KAN4oFkh1aK1BfD8
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22 changed files with 2423 additions and 405 deletions
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@ -54,11 +54,44 @@ function peerIp(req) {
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return normalizeIp(req.socket && req.socket.remoteAddress) || 'unknown';
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}
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// Does this request come from a proxy whose X-Forwarded-* headers we believe?
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function isTrustedPeer(req, trustProxy) {
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// TRUSTED_PROXIES: extra proxy addresses believed under TRUST_PROXY=auto, on top of the private ranges. The built-in
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// "private" list misses a proxy that reaches the game over a global IPv6 address, Tailscale / CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10) or
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// any other routable address. Accepts an array or a comma separated string of IPs and CIDRs, IPv4 or IPv6
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// ("100.64.0.0/10, 2001:db8::6, 2001:db8:1::/48"). Returns null for an empty list, throws on a malformed entry (a
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// typo must stop the start-up, not silently leave the proxy untrusted). The result has .has(ip) and .list.
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function parseTrustedProxies(v) {
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const items = Array.isArray(v) ? v : String(v === undefined || v === null ? '' : v).split(',');
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const list = items.map((s) => String(s).trim()).filter(Boolean);
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if (!list.length) return null;
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const bl = new net.BlockList();
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for (const item of list) {
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const slash = item.indexOf('/');
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const addr = normalizeIp(slash < 0 ? item : item.slice(0, slash));
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const type = net.isIPv4(addr) ? 'ipv4' : net.isIPv6(addr) ? 'ipv6' : null;
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const max = type === 'ipv4' ? 32 : 128;
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const prefixText = slash < 0 ? null : item.slice(slash + 1);
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const prefix = prefixText === null ? max : (/^\d{1,3}$/.test(prefixText) ? Number(prefixText) : NaN);
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if (!type || !(prefix >= 0 && prefix <= max) ||
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(item.startsWith('::ffff:') && slash >= 0)) { // a v4-mapped prefix would need its own arithmetic: write the IPv4 form
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throw new Error('invalid TRUSTED_PROXIES entry ' + JSON.stringify(item) + ' (use an IP or CIDR such as 100.64.0.0/10 or 2001:db8::6)');
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}
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if (prefixText === null) bl.addAddress(addr, type); else bl.addSubnet(addr, prefix, type);
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}
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return {
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list,
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has(ip) {
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const a = normalizeIp(ip);
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return net.isIPv4(a) ? bl.check(a, 'ipv4') : net.isIPv6(a) ? bl.check(a, 'ipv6') : false;
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},
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};
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}
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// Does this request come from a proxy whose X-Forwarded-* headers we believe? `trusted` = parseTrustedProxies() result.
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function isTrustedPeer(req, trustProxy, trusted) {
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if (trustProxy === true) return true;
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if (trustProxy === false) return false;
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return isPrivateIp(peerIp(req));
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const ip = peerIp(req);
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return isPrivateIp(ip) || !!(trusted && trusted.has(ip));
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}
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// One entry of a forwarding header ("203.0.113.9", "[2001:db8::5]:443", "1.2.3.4:5555") -> bare IP or null.
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@ -95,17 +128,17 @@ function forwardedClientIp(value) {
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}
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// The address used for logging and the per-IP socket cap.
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function clientIp(req, trustProxy) {
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function clientIp(req, trustProxy, trusted) {
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const peer = peerIp(req);
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if (!isTrustedPeer(req, trustProxy)) return peer;
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if (!isTrustedPeer(req, trustProxy, trusted)) return peer;
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return forwardedClientIp(req.headers['x-forwarded-for']) ||
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firstForwardedIp(req.headers['x-real-ip']) || peer;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------- Origin check
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// Scheme-less, lower-case "host[:port]" with the default ports 80 / 443 dropped.
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// Accepts a bare host ("Game.Example.com:443"), a Host header, or a full origin ("https://x.example").
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function normalizeHost(s) {
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// Scheme-less, lower-case host name and port of a bare host ("Game.Example.com:443"), a Host header or a full origin
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// ("https://x.example"): { name, port }, with port '' for none or for the default ports 80 / 443. null if unusable.
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function hostParts(s) {
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if (typeof s !== 'string') return null;
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let v = s.trim();
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if (!v) return null;
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@ -117,27 +150,43 @@ function normalizeHost(s) {
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try { u = new URL(v); } catch (e) { return null; }
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if (!u.hostname) return null;
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const port = u.port; // '' for the scheme's own default
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const h = u.hostname.toLowerCase(); // IPv6 keeps its brackets
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return port && port !== '80' && port !== '443' ? h + ':' + port : h;
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return { name: u.hostname.toLowerCase(), port: port && port !== '80' && port !== '443' ? port : '' }; // IPv6 keeps its brackets
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}
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// "host[:port]" form of hostParts().
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function normalizeHost(s) {
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const p = hostParts(s);
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return p ? (p.port ? p.name + ':' + p.port : p.name) : null;
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}
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// Returns true when a WebSocket upgrade with this Origin may proceed.
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// no Origin header -> true (non-browser clients)
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// Origin host == Host -> true
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// Origin host == X-Forwarded-Host (first) -> true, only when the peer is a trusted proxy
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// Origin host name == Host name, Host without a port -> true, only when the peer is a trusted proxy (see below)
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// Origin host in allowedOrigins -> true
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// opts: { trustProxy, trustedProxies (parseTrustedProxies() result), allowedOrigins }.
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function originAllowed(req, opts) {
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const origin = req.headers.origin;
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if (origin === undefined) return true;
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const o = (typeof origin === 'string' && origin.toLowerCase() !== 'null' && /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(origin))
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? normalizeHost(origin) : null;
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? hostParts(origin) : null;
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if (!o) return false;
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if (o === normalizeHost(req.headers.host)) return true;
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if (isTrustedPeer(req, opts.trustProxy)) {
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const h = hostParts(req.headers.host);
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if (h && o.name === h.name && o.port === h.port) return true;
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if (isTrustedPeer(req, opts.trustProxy, opts.trustedProxies)) {
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const xfh = req.headers['x-forwarded-host'];
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if (typeof xfh === 'string' && o === normalizeHost(xfh.split(',')[0])) return true;
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if (typeof xfh === 'string' && normalizeHost(xfh.split(',')[0]) === normalizeHost(origin)) return true;
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// Published on a port other than 80/443 (https://game.example.com:8443) behind nginx / nginx Proxy Manager: their
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// "proxy_set_header Host $host" drops the port, so Host is "game.example.com" while the browser's Origin keeps
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// ":8443", and neither the X-Forwarded-Host nor an ALLOWED_ORIGINS entry written without the port helps. A browser that
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// talks to this server directly on its port (8080 by default, never 80/443 unless you chose that) puts the port in
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// Host, so a Host WITHOUT one from a trusted proxy is what a stripped port looks like: accept the same host name on
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// any port. Another name still fails.
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if (h && !h.port && o.name === h.name) return true;
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}
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for (const a of opts.allowedOrigins || []) if (o === normalizeHost(a)) return true;
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const on = normalizeHost(origin);
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for (const a of opts.allowedOrigins || []) if (on === normalizeHost(a)) return true;
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return false;
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}
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@ -220,6 +269,6 @@ function listUrls(bound, port, ifaces) {
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}
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module.exports = {
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normalizeIp, isPrivateIp, parseTrustProxy, peerIp, isTrustedPeer, firstForwardedIp, forwardedClientIp, clientIp,
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normalizeHost, originAllowed, TokenBucket, listenDual, listUrls, fmtUrl,
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normalizeIp, isPrivateIp, parseTrustProxy, parseTrustedProxies, peerIp, isTrustedPeer, firstForwardedIp, forwardedClientIp, clientIp,
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hostParts, normalizeHost, originAllowed, TokenBucket, listenDual, listUrls, fmtUrl,
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};
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