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7 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Frederic Jung
d56039695c
Attacks arrive as on 1.36 again: drop the distributed multi-ingress flood model
Frederic's call for 2.0: keep #153's fixes, NOC breakdown, new vectors, gaming risk
and overlapping attacks, but not the per-port model. It split every flood over each
ingress port with traffic (over a thousand on a big network), stored them all in the
save, routed one pinned flow per port, and with it came the build-order and
victim-scoring bugs found in review.

Each attack is again one entry port at the victim (a.entry): upstream clean-pipe,
Flowspec on the victim's router, IX blackholing, a sacrificial PNI and RouteScript
filter it in that order (ddosMitigation), then scrubbing; what leaks is junk at the
victim spread like its traffic, exactly as on main. Saves from 2.0 builds with
a.entries load: sanitize drops the shares and a 'distributed' entry becomes 'edge'.
Removed: R.ingressPorts, ddosEntries/ddosFold/ddosSlices/ddosCities/ddosHasIx, pinned
flows (and the pinned-rank handling in routing and its reference), the mixed-TCAM
line and the 'across N ports' message, and their tests; the scrubbing source-city
test now uses two victims sharing one center. CHANGELOG #153 bullets describe what
ships and credit #153.
2026-10-28 20:53:58 +01:00
Frederic Jung
b5cba3e591
BGP at 3 a.m. brings twice On-call's DDoS, as it says, not twenty times
Spicy chaos moved attacks onto the gamers' daily schedule without scaling it, so the
preset had about 20x the attacks of On-call. Without gaming customers, attacks stay
on the failure schedule (which spicy already runs 1.8x as often, with a slightly
heavier DDoS weight to make it 2x); gaming customers still bring their busier one.
2026-10-28 20:23:44 +01:00
Frederic Jung
e80fd0e453
Spicy chaos stretches exactly what an incident holds down
stretchInc() stretched anything ending on the same day: always the primary attack
(even when the incident was about another one, never the overlapping ones) and any
unrelated outage that happened to end then. It now finds the attack by i.atk and
everything else by the incident's ref, as clearInc() does, and saves allow the
longest stretched attack (11 days).
2026-10-28 20:19:41 +01:00
Frederic Jung
40e4c79139
Attacks keep their 12 biggest ingress ports and fold the rest, so saves stay small
Every attack stored every ingress port with traffic (over a thousand on a big
network), which grew the save from 272 KB to 1.8 MB with 14 attacks. The rest is now
one share at the victim, routed like the classic flood over its usual exits; old
saves are folded on load.
2026-10-28 20:16:20 +01:00
Frederic Jung
25e3e6db33
DDoS attacks are scored and SLA-charged at their victim only
ddosSf() took the worst service of every city with an ingress port, so on a big
network every attack counted as lost and charged SLA payouts to protected customers
anywhere. Held/lost, the SLA check and the far-scrubbing warning now look at the
attacked city.
2026-10-28 20:11:06 +01:00
Frederic Jung
675c63d561
Floods cross the backbone to their victim again, whatever order the POPs were built in
Each ingress slice gave its junk the ingress city as source, so a flood only filled
the port it came in on: it never loaded the backbone or the victim's router, as it
did before distributed ingress. Junk is now created at the victim, pinned to its
entry port, before any real traffic and in attack order, so S.pops order no longer
decides who gets a full port. A port the victim cannot reach still fills.
2026-10-28 20:09:18 +01:00
Frederic Jung
6d839102b5
Pinned attack flows route at their entry port's own rank, not a cone rank
base() now takes the target network; pinned junk has none, so coneOf() called every
PNI a cone route and the flood was routed late (behind real traffic) or not at all.
Pinned flows use the port's own rank (low preference still last), those ranks join
RSET, and the reference allocation in the routing test does the same.
2026-10-28 19:58:25 +01:00