Addresses a multi-agent code review (26 confirmed findings + a URLSession leak) across correctness, concurrency, security, and cleanup: - MongoDocument.id: deterministic fallback (was UUID() on every access) to stop SwiftUI List/ForEach identity churn; getAll pagination drives its cursor off the real _id via documentId, so a missing _id stops paging instead of looping on a fabricated cursor. - View models: per-load generation guard (+ captured-tab guard on ONU detail) so a cancelled or overlapping load can't commit stale results or land data on the wrong tab. - JSONValue.intValue: guard Int(d) against NaN/inf/out-of-range (crash). - ServerTrustEvaluator: hash the real SubjectPublicKeyInfo (prepend the algorithm-specific ASN.1 SPKI header) so a standard openssl-captured public-key pin actually matches; unknown key types fail closed. - AppEnvironment.configure: clear stale cookies + Keychain creds on host change. - FirmwareFile.isCompatible: empty metadata no longer passes as compatible-for-all. - APIClient: invalidate URLSession on deinit (per-configure/probe leak). - Dashboard best-effort sections keep last-good on transient failure; unified optical thresholds; LoginView prefill-once; populatedBuckets unique ForEach id; Format rounding rollover; dead-code/docstring/dedup cleanups. Verification pending on the Mac (no Swift toolchain on the Linux dev box). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
158 lines
7 KiB
Swift
158 lines
7 KiB
Swift
import Foundation
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import Security
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import CryptoKit
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/// How to evaluate the server's TLS certificate.
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///
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/// MCMS appliances usually present a self-signed or internal-CA certificate.
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/// Pick the *narrowest* policy that works for your deployment. Never ship
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/// `.allowSelfSignedForHost` against a host you don't control.
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enum ServerTrustPolicy: Equatable, Codable {
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/// Default OS trust evaluation (use this if the box has a real cert or a
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/// CA your devices already trust via MDM/profile — strongly preferred).
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case system
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/// Accept the server's certificate ONLY for this exact host, after a normal
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/// trust evaluation that ignores the "untrusted root" failure. Scoped escape
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/// hatch for self-signed boxes on a controlled mgmt network/VPN.
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case allowSelfSignedForHost(String)
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/// Certificate/public-key pinning: trust only if the leaf's SHA-256
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/// public-key hash (base64) matches one of these. The safest option for a
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/// fixed appliance — capture the hash once and pin it.
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case pinPublicKeySHA256([String], host: String)
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}
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/// `URLSessionDelegate` that applies a `ServerTrustPolicy`. Retained by the
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/// `URLSession` it's attached to.
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final class ServerTrustEvaluator: NSObject, URLSessionDelegate {
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private let policy: ServerTrustPolicy
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init(policy: ServerTrustPolicy) {
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self.policy = policy
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}
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func urlSession(
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_ session: URLSession,
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didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge,
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completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void
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) {
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guard challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodServerTrust,
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let trust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust else {
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completionHandler(.performDefaultHandling, nil)
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return
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}
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let host = challenge.protectionSpace.host
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switch policy {
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case .system:
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completionHandler(.performDefaultHandling, nil)
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case .allowSelfSignedForHost(let allowedHost):
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// Scoped escape hatch for self-signed appliances on a controlled
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// network. Because a self-signed root fails normal evaluation, this
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// accepts ANY certificate the allowed host presents — including
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// expired or name-mismatched ones. The only gate is the hostname, so
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// use this only on hosts you control; prefer `.pinPublicKeySHA256`
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// once you can capture the appliance's key hash.
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guard host == allowedHost else {
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completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
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return
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}
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completionHandler(.useCredential, URLCredential(trust: trust))
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case .pinPublicKeySHA256(let pins, let pinnedHost):
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guard host == pinnedHost,
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let leaf = Self.leafCertificate(from: trust),
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let hash = Self.publicKeySHA256Base64(for: leaf),
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pins.contains(hash) else {
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completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
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return
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}
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completionHandler(.useCredential, URLCredential(trust: trust))
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}
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}
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// MARK: - Pinning helpers
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private static func leafCertificate(from trust: SecTrust) -> SecCertificate? {
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if #available(iOS 15.0, *) {
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return (SecTrustCopyCertificateChain(trust) as? [SecCertificate])?.first
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} else {
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return SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex(trust, 0)
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}
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}
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/// Base64 of SHA-256 over the DER-encoded **SubjectPublicKeyInfo**, i.e. the
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/// standard public-key pin. `SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation` returns only the
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/// raw key (PKCS#1 `RSAPublicKey` for RSA, the `04||X||Y` point for EC) — NOT
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/// the SPKI — so we prepend the algorithm-specific ASN.1 SPKI header before
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/// hashing. The result matches the canonical capture:
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///
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/// openssl s_client -connect host:443 </dev/null 2>/dev/null \
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/// | openssl x509 -pubkey -noout \
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/// | openssl pkey -pubin -outform der \
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/// | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64
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///
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/// Returns nil for key types/sizes without a known header (caller fails closed).
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static func publicKeySHA256Base64(for certificate: SecCertificate) -> String? {
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guard let key = SecCertificateCopyKey(certificate),
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let raw = SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation(key, nil) as Data?,
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let attrs = SecKeyCopyAttributes(key) as? [String: Any],
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let keyType = attrs[kSecAttrKeyType as String] as? String,
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let keySize = attrs[kSecAttrKeySizeInBits as String] as? Int,
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let header = spkiHeader(keyType: keyType, keySizeInBits: keySize)
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else { return nil }
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var spki = Data(header)
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spki.append(raw)
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return CryptoSHA256.base64(of: spki)
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}
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/// ASN.1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo prefix for the raw key returned by
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/// `SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation`, keyed by (algorithm, key size). These
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/// are the fixed, well-known DER headers; the raw key bits follow.
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private static func spkiHeader(keyType: String, keySizeInBits: Int) -> [UInt8]? {
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if keyType == (kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA as String) {
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switch keySizeInBits {
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case 2048: return rsa2048SPKIHeader
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case 3072: return rsa3072SPKIHeader
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case 4096: return rsa4096SPKIHeader
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default: return nil
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}
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}
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if keyType == (kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom as String) {
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switch keySizeInBits {
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case 256: return ecP256SPKIHeader
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case 384: return ecP384SPKIHeader
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default: return nil
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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private static let rsa2048SPKIHeader: [UInt8] = [
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0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
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0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00]
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private static let rsa3072SPKIHeader: [UInt8] = [
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0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xa2, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
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0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x8f, 0x00]
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private static let rsa4096SPKIHeader: [UInt8] = [
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0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
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0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x02, 0x0f, 0x00]
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private static let ecP256SPKIHeader: [UInt8] = [
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0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02,
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0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03,
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0x42, 0x00]
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private static let ecP384SPKIHeader: [UInt8] = [
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0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02,
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0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00]
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}
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/// Minimal SHA-256 wrapper using CryptoKit.
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enum CryptoSHA256 {
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static func base64(of data: Data) -> String {
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let digest = SHA256.hash(data: data)
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return Data(digest).base64EncodedString()
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}
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}
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