Addresses a multi-agent code review (26 confirmed findings + a URLSession leak) across correctness, concurrency, security, and cleanup: - MongoDocument.id: deterministic fallback (was UUID() on every access) to stop SwiftUI List/ForEach identity churn; getAll pagination drives its cursor off the real _id via documentId, so a missing _id stops paging instead of looping on a fabricated cursor. - View models: per-load generation guard (+ captured-tab guard on ONU detail) so a cancelled or overlapping load can't commit stale results or land data on the wrong tab. - JSONValue.intValue: guard Int(d) against NaN/inf/out-of-range (crash). - ServerTrustEvaluator: hash the real SubjectPublicKeyInfo (prepend the algorithm-specific ASN.1 SPKI header) so a standard openssl-captured public-key pin actually matches; unknown key types fail closed. - AppEnvironment.configure: clear stale cookies + Keychain creds on host change. - FirmwareFile.isCompatible: empty metadata no longer passes as compatible-for-all. - APIClient: invalidate URLSession on deinit (per-configure/probe leak). - Dashboard best-effort sections keep last-good on transient failure; unified optical thresholds; LoginView prefill-once; populatedBuckets unique ForEach id; Format rounding rollover; dead-code/docstring/dedup cleanups. Verification pending on the Mac (no Swift toolchain on the Linux dev box). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
116 lines
4.2 KiB
Swift
116 lines
4.2 KiB
Swift
import Foundation
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import Observation
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/// Top-level app state. Owns the active `MCMSConnection`, persists the
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/// (non-secret) `APIConfiguration` to UserDefaults, and stores credentials in
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/// the Keychain. Rebuild the connection by calling `configure(_:)`.
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@MainActor
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@Observable
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final class AppEnvironment {
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private(set) var configuration: APIConfiguration?
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private(set) var connection: MCMSConnection?
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var isAuthenticated = false
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private let keychain = KeychainStore()
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private let defaults = UserDefaults.standard
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private let configKey = "mcms.configuration"
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init() { loadConfiguration() }
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var isConfigured: Bool { configuration != nil }
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// MARK: Configuration
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func configure(_ config: APIConfiguration) {
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// Pointing at a different server: drop the old host's session cookies and
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// saved credentials. Keychain accounts aren't host-scoped, so leaving them
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// would offer server A's login (and replay A's stale `sessionid`) on B.
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if configuration?.host != config.host {
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connection?.session.clear()
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forgetCredentials()
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}
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configuration = config
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connection = makeConnection(config)
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isAuthenticated = false
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persist(config)
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}
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/// Builds a connection wired to route 401/403 back to the login screen.
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private func makeConnection(_ config: APIConfiguration) -> MCMSConnection {
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let connection = MCMSConnection(config: config)
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connection.onAuthExpired = { [weak self] in self?.handleAuthExpired() }
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return connection
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}
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/// A request hit 401/403 — the session expired. Drop to login; saved
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/// credentials remain so the user can sign back in.
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private func handleAuthExpired() {
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guard isAuthenticated else { return }
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isAuthenticated = false
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}
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private func persist(_ config: APIConfiguration) {
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if let data = try? JSONEncoder().encode(config) {
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defaults.set(data, forKey: configKey)
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}
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}
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private func loadConfiguration() {
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guard let data = defaults.data(forKey: configKey),
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let config = try? JSONDecoder().decode(APIConfiguration.self, from: data)
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else { return }
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configuration = config
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connection = makeConnection(config)
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}
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// MARK: Credentials (Keychain)
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var savedEmail: String? { keychain.get(account: "email") }
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var savedPassword: String? { keychain.get(account: "password") }
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private func saveCredentials(email: String, password: String) {
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keychain.set(email, account: "email")
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keychain.set(password, account: "password")
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}
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func forgetCredentials() {
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keychain.delete(account: "email")
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keychain.delete(account: "password")
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}
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// MARK: Session
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func signIn(email: String, password: String, remember: Bool) async throws {
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guard let connection else { throw APIError.transport(message: "No connection configured") }
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try await connection.auth.login(email: email, password: password)
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if remember { saveCredentials(email: email, password: password) }
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isAuthenticated = true
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}
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func signOut() async {
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await connection?.auth.logout()
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isAuthenticated = false
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}
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/// Reachability / trust probe used by the Settings screen. Builds a throwaway
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/// connection and issues only an unauthenticated `version()` GET. (It shares
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/// `HTTPCookieStorage.shared` with the live session, but performs no login, so
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/// it does not alter authenticated session state.)
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/// A 401/403/404 still means the host answered over a trusted TLS channel —
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/// that's a successful reachability result; only transport/trust errors fail.
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func probe(_ config: APIConfiguration) async throws -> String {
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let connection = MCMSConnection(config: config)
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do {
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let version = try await connection.auth.version()
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return version.displayVersion.map { "PON Manager \($0)" } ?? "Reachable"
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} catch let error as APIError {
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switch error {
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case .unauthorized, .forbidden, .notFound:
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return "Reachable — sign in to continue"
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default:
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throw error
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}
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}
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}
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}
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